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Abstract
This study exploits a new long-run data set of daily bid and offered exchange rates in spot and
forward markets from 1919 to the present to analyze carry returns in fixed and floating currency
regimes. We first find that outsized carry returns occur exclusively in the floating regime, being
zero in the fixed regime. Second, we show that fixed-to-floating regime shifts are associated with
negative returns to a carry strategy implemented only on floating currencies, robust to the
inclusion of volatility risks. These shifts are typically characterized by global flight-to-safety events
that represent bad times for carry traders.
I. Introduction
The carry strategy going long currencies with high interest rates and short
currencies with low interest rates delivers outsized mean returns. This result is based on
analysis of the post Bretton Woods era (e.g., Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011),
Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2011a)), a period dominated by floating
currencies. Our paper exploits a new foreign exchange data set to subject the carry
strategy to almost a century of currency returns and to analyze the relationship between
the carry trade and currency regimes.
Our study is similar to prior long-run studies of other important stylized facts in
finance: the equity risk premium, the value premium, and the underpricing of Initial Public
Offerings (IPOs). Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) analyzed long-run data on non-US stock
markets to show that estimates of the equity risk premium based solely on the US market
were upwardly biased. Davis, Fama, and French (2000) established the robustness of the
value factor in the cross section of US stock returns going back to 1926. Finally, Chambers
and Dimson (2009) showed that there was no underpricing of IPOs in the first half of the
twentieth century. Equally importantly, with such a long span of data, our study also
exploits the considerable variation in exchange rate regimes both over time and across
currencies to analyze how carry returns behave. Hence, we are the first to examine the
relationship between exchange rate regimes and carry trade returns.
Our new data set of daily bid and offered exchange rates in spot and forward
markets extending from 1919 to the present is an important contribution of this paper. The
year 1919 marks the dawn of modern currency trading with the emergence of a continuously
traded forward market in London. Consistent with the post Bretton Woods evidence, we
find that the carry trade earns positive average returns over the whole sample period. Our
estimated Sharpe ratio of between 0.5 and 0.6 is only slightly lower than the 0.7 to 0.8 for
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the post Bretton Woods sample. This finding of outsized carry returns across the whole
period is robust to differing portfolio weights and to the inclusion of transaction costs.
Unlike certain well-known stock market anomalies, the carry anomaly in foreign exchange
is one that does not seem to be disappearing over time (Jones and Pomorski (2017)).
We are not the first authors to examine carry returns out-of-sample. Doskov and
Swinkels (2015) report positive excess returns over the period of 1900 to 2012 albeit at a
level substantially lower than in the modern period. In contrast, we find positive excess
returns in our long-run sample at a considerably higher level of economic significance. Our
estimated Sharpe ratio of 0.55 is twice as large as that reported by Doskov and Swinkels
and much closer to levels we observe in the modern period.
Our study also addresses the shortcomings of prior studies of carry returns
out-of-sample. Doskov and Swinkels (2015) do not account for transaction costs and in the
absence of forward rates rely on differences in short-term interest rates. In the latter case,
forward premia are imperfectly proxied due to the heterogeneity in the credit risk,
maturity, and investability of the securities used in the first half of the last century. Two
short sample studies (Accominotti and Chambers (2016), Cen and Marsh (2016)) examine
carry returns in the 1920s and 1930s. Both studies fail to subject their findings to any
robustness tests and ignore the period of 1940 to 1975.
In contrast, this study uses a continuous, long-run sample of monthly returns
incorporating forward premia and bid-ask spreads. Furthermore, the finding of outsized
returns to a carry strategy is subjected to numerous robustness tests. Importantly, our use
of forward premia means that we are the first to report long-run results on a carry strategy
implementable in real time.
Our long sample incorporates the considerable heterogeneity in exchange rate
regimes both in the cross section of currencies and across time. Therefore, a second
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important contribution of our paper is the examination of the relationship between carry
trade returns and currency regimes. We exploit our data set to analyze this relationship by
conditioning the return to the carry trade on the exchange rate regime of each currency
pair at the beginning of each period.1 We classify any currency pair into a floating (fixed)
regime based on whether its exchange rate volatility is above (below) a certain threshold.
Our choice of threshold derives from a simple statistical approach based on exchange rate
volatility which is similar to Shambaugh (2004). This approach identifies a large number of
shifts in currency regime across our long sample and hence allows us to consider the
relationship between such shifts and carry trade returns.
Our first main finding is that carry trade returns vary with exchange rate regimes.
Average excess returns of the unconditional carry trade are entirely driven by returns to
the carry strategy conditioned on the sample of currency pairs in the floating exchange rate
regime. We term this strategy the floating carry trade. In comparison, the carry strategy
conditioned on the sample of currency pairs in the fixed exchange rate regime (the fixed
carry trade) generates zero returns on average. Although the carry component of fixed carry
trade returns is substantial at 2%–3% per annum, these gains are exactly offset by losses
from spot rate depreciation when fixed exchange rate regimes collapse. The absence of fixed
carry trade profits may well reflect the fact that central bank intervention frequently
mimics the carry trade when currencies are pegged, especially during bad times when pegs
are under pressure (Fratzscher, Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling, and Stoehr (2018)).
There are four other results related to our main finding regarding the regime
dependence of carry returns. First, we conclude that the skewness of returns to the floating
1We apply the term regime to currency pairs. Thus, for example, the Swiss franc may be in a fixed regime
against the euro but concurrently in a floating regime against the dollar. When referring to (near) system-
wide exchange rate arrangements we use terms such as the Bretton Woods sample or era. Note that even
during periods when floating (fixed) rates dominate, some currency pairs were in fixed (floating) regimes.
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carry trade strategies in our long sample differs from the consensus view regarding
skewness in the literature. In the post Bretton Woods period dominated by floating
currencies, outsized carry returns display negative skewness (Menkhoff, Sarno, Schmeling,
and Schrimpf (2012)) and we confirm this result in our own sample. However, when we
examine skewness of floating and fixed carry returns separately in our long sample, only
the unprofitable fixed carry trade displays negative return skewness due to losses arising
from the collapse of currency pegs. In contrast, the return skewness of the profitable
floating carry trade is not significantly different from zero. Second, we further explore the
indirect relationship between floating carry returns and the fixed regime. We find that the
more that either currency in a floating pair is in a pegged relationship with other
currencies, the worse is the performance of the floating carry trade strategy. Third, our
results regarding the regime dependence of carry returns hold not only for the base-neutral
carry trade strategy but also for alternative specifications of the strategy employing
different base currencies. Last, we ascertain that the variation of carry trade returns is not
only related to the time series but also the cross section of exchange rate regimes across
currency pairs.
We run a range of empirical tests to check the robustness of our finding regarding
the importance of regime dependence for carry returns including employing alternative
volatility measures to classify regimes and experimenting with different volatility
thresholds. These results are detailed in the Internet Appendix.
Our second main finding is that the breakdown of currency pegs is associated with
significant floating carry trade losses. We show that these losses are concentrated in the
short portfolio of safe, funding currencies. The January 2015 abandonment by the Swiss
National Bank of its cap on the value of the franc against the euro is an example of such a
breakdown. This cap resulted in a low volatility regime where the franc was effectively
pegged to the euro. The breakdown of this particular peg coincided with poor carry trade
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returns when investment currencies such as the Australian and New Zealand dollars
depreciated against the pound sterling (GBP), while funding currencies such as the
Japanese yen and Swiss franc appreciated, consistent with a flight-to-safety and their
status as safe haven currencies (Ranaldo and Söderlind (2010)). Our regression analysis
verifies that this example is representative of the floating carry trade experiencing losses on
average at the time of fixed-to-floating regime changes. Furthermore, this finding is robust
to using alternative regime-change indicators and to controlling for volatility risks.
In addition, we find that many of the largest drawdowns conditional on peg
collapses coincide with historical events in international finance over the last century.
Typically such regime shifts are associated with a flight-to-safety and represent bad times
for carry traders. The outsized returns to the floating carry can be viewed as compensation
for such bad times.
Our paper contributes to four sets of literature. First, we add to the risk-based
explanations of outsized carry returns which suggest that countries differing in their
interest rates have asymmetric exposures to global shocks (e.g., Lustig et al. (2011), Lustig,
Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2014), Menkhoff et al. (2012), Dobrynskaya (2014), Lettau,
Maggiori, and Weber (2014), and Christiansen, Ranaldo, and Söderlind (2011)). Such
explanations are based on empirical analysis of the post Bretton Woods era. The
relationship between exchange rate regimes and carry trade returns is underexplored. Our
paper extends the literature by conditioning the standard carry trade strategy on both
floating and fixed regimes over almost a century.
Second, we supplement an emerging literature aiming to understand the sustained
profitability of the carry trade by analyzing the decomposition of carry trade returns (e.g.,
Koijen, Moskowitz, Pedersen, and Vrugt (2017), Hassan and Mano (2018)). By relating the
variation of carry trade returns to the time series and cross section of currency regimes, we
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provide a novel way to understand the outsized carry trade return puzzle in asset
pricing.
Third, our paper contributes to the literature that explains carry trade returns in
terms of crash risks, rare disasters or peso problems (e.g., Brunnermeier, Nagel, and
Pedersen (2008), Burnside et al. (2011a), Farhi and Gabaix (2016), Farhi, Fraiberger,
Ranciere, and Verdelhan (2013), Jurek (2014), and Chernov, Graveline, and Zviadadze
(2018)). These empirical studies assume carry trade returns are exposed to some large
unobserved negative shocks and estimate carry trade returns hedged by currency options in
a relatively short sample. By contrast, in seeking to explain carry trade returns, our study
makes explicit one type of large negative shock well represented in our long sample,
namely, the fixed-to-floating regime shift.
Fourth, we touch upon a literature relating carry trade returns to skewness. This
strategy which goes long negatively skewed investment currencies and shorts positively
skewed funding currencies may earn positive mean returns since investors dislike skewness
(Brunnermeier et al. (2008), Osler (2012), and Rafferty (2012)). Our results challenge this
characteristic-based explanation given that, in our long sample, the profitable floating
carry trade is not significantly skewed but the unprofitable fixed carry trade is significantly
skewed. This finding adds to the evidence questioning the skewness-based explanation
uncovered in other studies (Bekaert and Panayotov (2015), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (2011b)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data.
Section III presents long-run evidence on carry trade returns. Section IV examines the
currency regime dependence of carry trade returns. In Section V, we document how peg
collapses are associated with poor performance of the floating carry trade and a
flight-to-safety by currency investors. Section VI concludes.
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II. Data
Our new dataset comprises daily bid and offered rates in spot and forward exchange
markets from Dec. 1919 to Dec. 2017, covering 19 currencies of developed countries, namely
Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and the Euro zone. We use this data to estimate carry trade
returns at monthly frequency before and after transaction costs, and measure monthly
volatility of exchange rates using daily data.
Our start date of 1919 reflects the establishment of a forward currency market in
London for the first time, together with a modern spot market based on dealings by
telegraphic transfer (Accominotti and Chambers (2016)). It is in this period that London
emerged as the major global center of currency trading (Atkin ((2005), pp. 40-41)).
Currency speculation by both professional and retail traders increased substantially in the
1920s and the 1930s (Einzig (1937)), and both Keynes (Accominotti and Chambers) and
Churchill (Clarke (2012)) could be counted among them.
We collect bid and ask quotations of spot and forward exchange rates from the
Financial Times Historical Archive for the period of 1919 to 1975 and WM/Reuters via
Datastream for the period of 1976 to 2017. Spot and forward rates are the last quotes of
the day until 1994 when the 4 pm London fix begins. In the interwar period, reported
foreign exchange quotes are the buying and selling rates at the close of business (Miller
((1929), p. 137), Phillips ((1926), p. 58)). We complement our dataset with other data
sources including the Manchester Guardian, Einzig (1937), Keynes (1923), Barclays Bank
International (BBI), Hai, Mark, and Wu (1997), and the Bank of England.
Restrictions on foreign exchange trading in London existed between the outbreak of
World War II (WWII) in September 1939 and the reintroduction of sterling convertibility
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for non-residents in Dec. 1958 (Atkin ((2005), pp. 101-112)). These would have
substantially affected the ability of speculators to fully implement the carry trade during
this time period. Consequently, whilst the results reported below cover the whole
uninterrupted sample period of 1919 to 2017, we also report results excluding the period of
1939 to 1958 in the Internet Appendix. Our findings remain unchanged.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our sample, including the number of
monthly observations, the mean and standard deviation of log excess returns (EXRET, %
per annum), one-month forward discounts (CARRY, % per annum), appreciation rates
(SPOT, % per annum), spot bid-ask spreads (BAS, basis points (bp)), and forward swap
bid-ask spreads (BAF, bp) for 18 exchange rates against GBP over the period of 1919 to
2017. Over the full sample period (Panel A), mean excess returns are generally small.
Furthermore, there exists a cross-sectional correlation between forward discount and
expected spot return in that currencies traded with a forward discount (premium) against
GBP tend to depreciate (appreciate). We also report descriptive statistics for three
subsamples: the interwar period (Dec. 1919 to July 1939) in Panel B, the WWII and
Bretton Woods era (Aug. 1939 to July 1971) in Panel C, and the post Bretton Woods era
(Aug. 1971 to Dec. 2017) in Panel D. Exchange rate volatility is generally lower for the
WWII and Bretton Woods era when the fixed regime dominated than for the other two
subsamples in which the floating regime prevailed.
Figure 1 graphs the coverage of our sample, which starts with 4 currencies and
grows to 10 currencies by the early 1930s. These include the 9 currencies which were the
most actively traded in the 1920s and 1930s cited by Einzig ((1937), p. 104) plus the
Canadian dollar (CAD). The 9 currencies are the Belgian franc, the Swiss franc, the
German mark, the Spanish peseta, the French franc, the GBP, the Italian lira, the Dutch
guilder, and the U.S. dollar. The number then drops to 5 during WWII and begins to
increase again after the war, reaching another peak in the post Bretton Woods period with
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18 currencies in the 1980s. The introduction of the euro in 1999 shrinks the sample back to
the G10 currencies.2
Although trading volumes were not published until 1986, foreign exchange market
activity was substantial before then. The Bank of England estimated daily foreign
exchange turnover on the London market in the 1920s as equivalent to 30% of British GDP
and 20% of world trade volume on an annual basis (Accominotti and Chambers (2016)).
Trading activity then declined sharply during WWII and during the first decade of Bretton
Woods. Thereafter, once current account convertibility was restored in 1958, currency
speculation resumed and London reemerged as the leading global center of foreign
exchange trading from the 1960s onwards (Atkin ((2005), p. 120)).
III. Long-Run Evidence on the Carry Trade
In this section, using our long-run foreign exchange dataset, we examine the
performance of the carry trade based on the following four definitions of the strategy:
• Linear weights a currency in proportion to its forward discount relative to the
cross-sectional average interest rate. The weight on currency i at time t is given by
(1) wi,1Linear,t = ALinear,t
(
φi,1t − φ1t
)
,
where ALinear,t is an adjustment factor that controls the investment scale to ensure
that long or short positions both sum to unity in absolute value, φi,1 denotes the
2We exclude currencies in countries with very high inflation: the German mark from June 1922 to Oct.
1923 and the Portuguese escudo from April 1974 to Dec. 1985.
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forward discount of currency i against GBP (indexed by “1”), and φ1t denotes the
average forward discount across all currencies against GBP. 3
• H1 − L1 invests in the currency with the highest forward discount and shorts the
currency with the lowest forward discount.
• H25% − L25% takes a long position in currencies in the top quartile ranked by the
forward discount and a short position in those in the bottom quartile. Currencies are
equal-weighted for the long position and the short position, respectively.
• Rank weights each currency in proportion to its rank in terms of its forward discount
relative to the cross-sectional median rank.
We take advantage of the availability of bid-ask quotes in our data set to evaluate
the effect of transaction costs on carry trade performance. To this end, we estimate the
costs incurred in the trading of both the spot and forward exchanges. Our estimate of
transaction costs in the spot market reduces the gross log excess return at time t by
(2) τspot,t =
∑
i
∣∣wi,1t − wi,1t−1∣∣ BASi,1t ,
where wi,1t is the portfolio weight on currency i at time t and BAS
i,1
t is the log bid-ask
spread of the spot rate of currency i against the reference currency. Note that the cost is
determined by portfolio turnover, measured by
∣∣wi,1t − wi,1t−1∣∣, and market liquidity,
captured by the bid-ask spread. In addition, the net excess return realised at time t (for the
period from t− 1 to t) is impacted by transaction costs incurred at the beginning and the
3The linear strategy in equation (1) is expressed in terms of currency pairs (i, 1) where 1 represents the
reference currency. In Appendix A we show that we can equivalently represent this weighting scheme in terms
of general currency pairs (i, j). This equivalence will be useful in Sections IV and V where we condition carry
trade returns on the regime applicable to each currency pair (i, j).
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end of the period. However, we only include the spot market transaction costs incurred at
the end of each period by assuming that the investor’s initial wealth at the beginning of
each period is after transaction costs incurred at the end of the previous period. This
choice has no impact on estimating the average return and evaluating long-term investment
performance. Finally, we take into account transaction costs incurred at the beginning and
the end of the whole sample and those incurred when a currency drops out of the sample or
when a currency (re-)appears in the sample.
Similarly, our estimate of the cost in the forward swap transactions reduces the
gross log excess return at time t by
(3) τfwd,t =
∑
i
∣∣wi,1t−1∣∣ BAFi,1t−1 ,
where BAFi,1t is the bid-ask spread of the log forward points of currency i against the
reference currency. Note that since the one-month forward swap transaction is always
settled, assuming no default by either counterparty, the transaction cost is always incurred
and is contracted at the beginning of each period.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the carry trade over the whole sample
period from 1919 to the present. The overall conclusion is that the carry trade generates
positive returns across all four weighting schemes and also before and after transaction
costs. The four carry trade strategies earn economically and statistically significant excess
returns, ranging from 3.28% to 7.63% per annum, depending on the choice of portfolio
weights and whether transaction costs are taken into account.
Although the choice of weighting scheme matters for the magnitude of average
excess returns, the Sharpe ratio is more consistent across our four strategies, ranging
between 0.51 and 0.55 before transaction costs and between 0.36 and 0.38 after transaction
costs. This result is driven by the fact that strategies with extreme weights, e.g., the
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H1 − L1 strategy, tend to deliver higher average returns but with more volatility and
without actually improving the risk-return tradeoff.
The decomposition of the excess return into the spot return and the carry
component is also informative. The profits of the carry trade tend to be entirely generated
from the carry component while the component due to spot exchange rate changes is not
only economically very small but also statistically insignificant, even though the sign is
always negative. This evidence is consistent with Koijen et al. (2017) who report based on
a panel regression analysis that high-interest rate currencies neither depreciate, nor
appreciate, on average. Furthermore, transaction costs matter for both return components.
Transaction costs in the spot market reduce the average return by about 0.5% while
transaction costs in the forward swaps, which are independent of the spot exchange, reduce
the average return by about 1%. Last but not least, we find positive (1.54) but statistically
insignificant skewness in our long sample of carry returns. This finding contrasts with that
of negative skewness in the post Bretton Woods period. We return to this subject
below.
In the rest of the paper, we report carry trade returns employing the linear strategy.
Our results are unaltered by the choice of alternative weighting schemes. Figure 2 graphs
the cumulative log excess return to the linear carry trade strategy over the full sample
period before and after transaction costs. The return to the carry trade exhibits substantial
time-variation. Outperformance occurs in the 1920s and 1930s, and from the 1970s
onwards. The intervening decades, when returns are substantially lower, coincides with the
Bretton Woods era of fixed exchange rates. The next section examines the dependence of
carry trade returns on currency regime in more detail.
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IV. Carry Trade Conditional on Currency Regimes
We next examine the performance of the carry trade conditional on the classification
of exchange rate regime for each currency pair in our sample. At the beginning of each
month within our full sample period, we first classify the exchange rate regime for each
currency pair based on the ex ante volatility of its cross rate. Then we condition the carry
trade strategy on each exchange rate regime and examine the performance of two
regime-based carry trade strategies: the floating carry trade and the fixed carry trade.
A. Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes
Our sample period of almost a century can be divided into three episodes: the
interwar period, the WWII and Bretton Woods era, and the post Bretton Woods era.
Eichengreen (1996) provides a detailed analysis of the major developments in the
international monetary system throughout all three episodes. The interwar period began
with the removal of wartime capital controls in 1919 which forced European governments to
float their currencies. By the end of 1927, all major currencies (except the Spanish peseta)
had switched from floating to fixed exchange rates. This return to the gold standard proved
short-lived as currency pegs were abandoned during the 1930s, particularly following the
sterling crisis in Sept. 1931. At the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, countries agreed to
maintain fixed (but adjustable) exchange rates relative to the U.S. dollar, which was itself
convertible into gold. This was initially a success. However, first the GBP in the mid-1960s
and then the U.S. dollar in the late 1960s and early 1970s were subject to considerable
speculation as their pegs became increasingly difficult to defend. By 1973, Bretton Woods
was at an end and the major currencies of the world largely persevered with floating
exchange rates thereafter. The major exception was the emergence of the euro in 1999. In
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each of these three episodes, there was substantial cross-country heterogeneity in the choice
of currency regime. Very rarely did all countries adopt the same regime.
When considering exchange rate regime classification, one approach is to use the
macroeconomics-based method of Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2004). However, this
approach simply describes whether the currency of a country is fixed or floating without
reference to a certain anchor. Moreover, regime classification is not possible for all currency
pairs following such an approach. Given these limitations, we opt for a de facto regime
classification based on exchange rate volatility, similar to Shambaugh (2004). In our main
analysis, we classify exchange rate regimes using cross rate volatility σi,jt measured as an
exponentially moving average of spot returns for each currency pair (i, j) at time t, i.e.,
σi,jt = 100×
√
261× (1− ρ)∑t−1u=0 ρu|∆si,jt−u|, where ρ = 0.99 is chosen such that the half-life
of past exchange rate is about three months. We later check the robustness of our results
using alternative volatility measures to classify exchange rate regimes.
It is worth highlighting the main advantages of our approach. First, volatility is
measured without look-ahead bias and therefore can be estimated in real time. Second, we
can classify the regime of any currency pair, subject to the availability of exchange rate
data. Third, our volatility-based classification captures the effective regime either when
currencies are locked in a multilateral fashion, or when there are occasional interventions
that create a wedge between the official exchange rate status and actual exchange rate
movements.
Based on the ex ante volatility measure, we classify each currency pair (i, j) at time
t into two regimes z defined as
(4) z =

Fixed, if σi,jt < V
Floating, if σi,jt ≥ V ,
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where V is the volatility threshold. For our main analysis, we choose V = 4%. This choice
of volatility threshold demonstrates consistency with the generally accepted classification of
regimes. For example, in the first instance, the G10 exchange rates against the U.S. dollar
in the post Euro period are correctly classified as floating, since the minimum volatility
estimates in this subsample lie slightly above 4%. However, if we chose a lower volatility
threshold, say 2% per annum, currencies in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) would be incorrectly classified as floating in the early 1980s.
Figure 3 graphs the time series of the fraction of currency pairs classified into fixed
and floating exchange rate regimes based on a 4% threshold. The floating (fixed) regime
fraction consists of all currency pairs with a volatility above (below) this threshold. The
distribution of regimes is somewhat concentrated over time. The floating regime dominates
in the post Bretton Woods period and the fixed regime does so in the Bretton Woods
period and during WWII. The interwar period, consistent with the historical narrative,
displays more regime heterogeneity.
B. Regime-Dependent Carry Trade Performance
We now condition the return to the linear carry trade strategy on the ex ante
exchange rate regime. This is equivalent to a double portfolio sorting which treats the
currency regime as a cross-sectional currency characteristic in addition to the interest rate
differential. Because currency regime is a characteristic variable applicable to all currency
pairs, we start by representing the carry trade strategy by a portfolio of all currency pairs.
Formally, let the log excess return to the carry trade be
(5) rCTt+1 =
∑
i,j
wi,jt r
i,j
t+1 ,
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where the weight on each currency pair is denoted as
(6) wi,jt = At φ
i,j
t = At
(
φi,1t − φj,1t
)
,
with At being an adjustment factor that alters the scale of investment, and the
corresponding log excess return is defined as
(7) ri,jt+1 = f
i,j
t − si,jt+1 = φi,jt −∆si,jt+1 ,
where f i,j and si,j are the log forward and spot exchange rates associated with currency
pair (i, j), respectively, and ∆si,jt+1 is the rate of depreciation of currency i relative to
currency j from time t to t+ 1. In Appendix A, we show that this representation is
equivalent to the linear carry trade strategy in terms of exchange rates against a given
reference currency indexed by ‘1’ presented in Section III.
Our next step is to decompose the return to the carry trade into two
regime-dependent strategies, i.e., the fixed carry trade and the floating carry trade as
rCTt+1 = ω
Fixed
t r
Fixed
t+1 + ω
Float
t r
Float
t+1 ,(8)
where
rzt+1 =
1
ωzt
∑
i,j
wi,jt r
i,j
t+1 I
i,j
t (z)(9)
ωzt =
∑
i,j I
i,j
t (z)∑
i,j 1
,
and Ii,jt (z) is a dummy variable indicating whether currency pair (i, j) at time t is in regime
z ∈ {Fixed, Float}, and Ii,i(z) ≡ 0 for ∀ z. This decomposition provides an interpretation
of the carry trade as a strategy that dynamically allocates portfolio weights on each regime
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style z based on the the fraction ωzt in the investment universe. Note that when a certain
regime, say the fixed regime, is absent from the investment universe, i.e, ωFixedt = 0, and
ωFloatt = 1, the fixed-regime excess return corresponds to a missing value. Therefore, carry
trade returns are totally driven by the floating regime, i.e., rCTt+1 = rFloatt+1 .
Table 3 presents summary statistics of returns to the fixed and floating carry trade
strategies. The profitability of the carry trade is solely attributable to the returns of
floating currency pairs. The average gross excess return to the floating carry trade is 9.38%
per annum and the Sharpe ratio is 0.61 on an annualized basis. In comparison, the fixed
carry trade delivers an insignificant excess return of 0.72% per annum on average and an
insignificant Sharpe ratio of only 0.11. These results and the results in the rest of the paper
remain unchanged when we exclude the period of 1939 to 1958. All these results are
included in the Internet Appendix.
The importance of regime for the performance of the carry trade strategy remains
true when transaction costs are taken into account. The fixed carry trade generates losses
of 55bp a year with the Sharpe ratio being -0.08. The floating carry trade, on the other
hand, earns a significantly positive excess return of 7.11% per annum on average with a
significantly positive Sharpe ratio of 0.46. Figure 4 contrasts the performance of the
floating and fixed carry strategies both before and after transaction costs across the whole
sample period. The time series pattern in the floating carry returns is similar to those of
the unconditional carry strategy shown in Figure 2. In contrast, there is relatively little
variation in fixed strategy returns.
We next consider the cross-sectional correlation between interest rate differentials
and exchange rate changes by decomposing excess returns into the carry and spot return
components. After transaction costs, the exchange rate of a floating currency pair with
positive interest rate differentials (+7.23% per annum) does not change significantly
(-0.12% per annum). This finding suggests that floating currency pairs approximately
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follow a random walk and forward rate unbiasedness is violated. The further implication is
that the interest rate differential represents a risk premium.
By contrast, the high interest rate currency of a fixed currency pair tends to
depreciate substantially relative to the low interest rate currency when the currency peg
collapses. Importantly, the insignificant fixed carry trade returns do not arise from an
absence of interest rate differentials for fixed currency pairs. In fact, the carry component
of the fixed carry trade is statistically significant and reasonably high (+3.13% per annum
before transaction costs). However, after transaction costs, the gains from the interest rate
differential (+2.34% per annum) are offset by capital losses from future spot exchange rate
changes (-2.89% per annum) in the month when the peg collapses. This finding suggests
that for fixed carry trade pairs, exchange rate changes are predicted by interest differentials
and that forward rate unbiasedness holds. There is no risk premium for the fixed carry
trade.
We perform two checks to confirm our results on the lack of a return to the fixed
carry trade. First, we check whether in countries with high yielding pegged currencies
financial repression compresses their short-term interest rates and hence the interest rate
differential of the carry trade. On the assumption that long bond yields are less affected by
financial repression, we examine whether the magnitude of long bond yield differentials
differs from the forward discount in a fixed regime. Accordingly we estimate the following
regression:
(10) φi,jt = −0.0002 + 1.11
(
yit,10 − yjt,10
)− 0.30 (yit,10 − yjt,10) Ii,jt + λij + i,jt ,
where yit,10 and y
j
t,10 denote the ten-year bond yields for currencies i and j respectively, I
i,j
t
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if currency pair (i, j) at time t is in the fixed regime,
and 0 otherwise. Coefficients are estimated from a panel regression with fixed effects (λi,j).
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The statistically significant negative coefficient on the yield spread interacted with the
fixed regime indicator suggests that one-month forward discounts are lower in fixed regimes
than the ten-year yield spread would predict. This is consistent with the view that financial
repression compresses short-term interest rate differentials. We then reconstruct the carry
trade strategy after adjusting the forward discounts of fixed currency pairs using the
results from equation (10). Even when these higher carry components are included, they
are fully offset by spot rate depreciation such that there is no risk premium.
Second, we consider whether there is a short-term overshoot of the depreciating
currency when a peg collapses such that spot exchange rate losses to the fixed carry trade
in the month immediately following the collapse are overstated. To test this conjecture, we
examine the spot returns of the fixed carry long-short portfolio, determined just prior to a
peg collapse, over an extended post-collapse window of 3 months. There is no evidence to
support an overshooting effect. Indeed, extending the holding period after the collapse of a
peg only worsens the return to the fixed carry trade as the investment currency continues
to depreciate (i.e. exchange rates undershoot following the collapse of the peg).
Our finding of a zero mean return to the fixed carry trade appears to be robust. One
way to rationalize this result is to think about the types of trader on each side of the fixed
carry strategy. Traders speculating against pegged currencies with weak fundamentals will
short high interest rate currencies in the expectation that they will depreciate once the peg
breaks. In other words, in the fixed regime, such speculators trade against carry.
Correspondingly, traders seeming to trade with a carry strategy in a fixed regime are likely
to be central banks attempting to support the high interest rate currency. Evidence in this
regard can be found in a new study by Fratzscher et al. (2018) examining the interventions
by 33 central banks beginning in 1995. Central banks trading with carry are not doing so
in search of a risk premium and this perhaps explains why the fixed carry earns no risk
premium.
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Finally, it is natural to ask whether the markedly different performance of the
floating and fixed carry strategies can be exploited by investors. The correlation between
fixed and floating carry returns is low at just 0.07. However, if traders were to pursue a
long floating-strategy/short fixed-strategy, the resulting Sharpe ratio at only 0.25 is
markedly inferior to that of a floating carry strategy (0.46).
C. Regime-Dependent Skewness
In the post Bretton Woods period, outsized carry returns display negative skewness
and are viewed as compensation for investors bearing this risk (Menkhoff et al. (2012)).
Whilst we obtain a similar result of negative skewness in unconditional carry trade returns
for the post Bretton Woods period (unreported), skewness for the whole sample period is
not statistically significantly different from zero (Table 2).
However, when we examine skewness of fixed and floating carry returns separately,
we see a different picture (Table 3). The zero-profit fixed carry trade after transaction costs
displays negative return skewness (-16.70), due to losses arising from the collapse of
currency pegs. In contrast, the return skewness of the profitable floating carry trade after
transaction costs is not significantly different from zero (0.30). Hence, this result casts some
doubt on the skewness-based explanation for outsized carry trade returns. We return to a
discussion of this finding in Section V.
D. Indirect Effect of the Fixed Regime on Floating Carry
Returns
The evidence presented so far suggests a direct relationship between currency
regimes and carry trade returns in so far as outsized carry trade returns seem to be
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concentrated in the floating regime. However, it is also possible that the fixed regime
indirectly affects floating carry trade performance.
To explore this indirect channel, we first measure the extent to which each floating
currency pair is interconnected with the fixed regime currencies. We sort floating currency
pairs into three groups. The first group, Low Mix Floating, includes floating currency pairs
with neither currency in the pair pegged to any other currency. The second group, Medium
Mix Floating, includes floating currency pairs with either currency in the pair pegged to
less than half of the remaining currencies. The third group, High Mix Floating, includes
floating currency pairs with both currencies in the pair pegged to more than half of the
remaining currencies.
Table 4 reports the excess returns, their decomposition, their second and third
moments, and the Sharpe ratio for each of these three sorts on the floating carry strategy
both before and after transaction costs. The Sharpe ratio of the floating carry trade before
(after) transaction costs decreases from 0.66 (0.51) for the Low Mix Floating group to 0.39
(0.20) for the High Mix Floating group. Hence, we conclude that the more that either
currency in a floating pair is in a pegged relationship with other currencies, the lower is the
performance of the floating carry trade strategy. The poorer performance of the High Mix
Floating group could reflect the incidence of spillovers from the collapse of currency pegs
on the floating sample compared to the Low Mix Floating group. This is a theme we return
to in Section V.
E. Base Carry Trade Strategy
So far we have shown that the correlation between interest rate differentials and
expected returns is not unconditional but depends on exchange rate regimes by examining
the standard dollar-neutral carry trade. Lustig et al. (2014) develop a new carry trade
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strategy that exploits the time-varying interest rate differential of a base currency (e.g., the
U.S. dollar) relative to a basket of foreign currencies. They conclude that the base carry
trade earns significant average excess return but exhibits different risk-return properties
from the dollar-neutral carry trade.
Accordingly, we test whether our finding of regime dependence holds for different
base currencies. The results are available from the authors. Only the floating base carry
trade delivers outsized returns while the fixed base carry trade is not profitable, regardless
of whether the base currency is the U.S. dollar, the GBP or the Deutsche mark (or Euro
from 1999 onwards). Consistent with Lustig et al. (2014), we find that return to the base
carry trade arises from both interest rate differentials and exchange rate changes, in
contrast to the standard base-neutral carry trade which generates profits entirely from the
carry component.
F. The Time Series and Cross Section of Regime Dependence
Previously we noted that the fraction of currency pairs in the floating regime is
higher in the 1920s and 1930s and in the post Bretton Woods era and correspondingly
lower in the Bretton Woods period and WWII (Figure 3). When viewed alongside the
striking time-variation in carry trade performance graphed in Figures 2 and 4, we might
conclude that the regime dependence documented above is a pure time series phenomenon.
This view would be incorrect. Here, we verify that the variation of carry trade returns is
also present in the cross section of exchange rate regimes.
We first note that in spite of the concentration of exchange rate regimes across time,
both regimes are present in all three sub-periods. Around a half of all currency pairs are
classified into the two regimes on average across the full sample period. The mean fractions
are 0.42 for the fixed regime and 0.58 for the floating regime. Although the fraction of each
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regime varies substantially across different subsample periods, both regimes are always
represented in the cross section. Moreover, there exist long time series of carry trade
returns for both regimes: out of the 1,175 months in our whole sample, there are 1,128
months with non-missing observations for the fixed regime and 930 months with
non-missing observations for the floating regime. We exploit this feature of our data to test
the robustness of our finding regarding the regime dependence of carry trade returns.
For each of our three subsamples, namely, the interwar period, the WWII and
Bretton Woods period, and the post Bretton Woods period, we compute the performance
of the fixed and floating carry trades. In all three subsamples, floating carry trade returns,
both before and after transaction costs remain outsized and fixed carry returns are zero
(Table 5).4
As an alternative approach, we model the time dimension of currency regimes by
classifying each month according to whether there are more fixed currency pairs than
floating ones or vice versa. Before and after transaction costs, both the excess return
(9.99% and 6.57%) and the Sharpe ratio (0.53 and 0.35) of the floating carry trade remain
positive even in those months where the fraction of fixed currency pairs is more than half
of all currency pairs in the sample.
G. Robustness
We subject our results to a number of robustness tests. First, given that we classify
exchange rate regimes based on a cross-rate volatility threshold, it could be that carry
trade performance is dependent on volatility per se. We show that risk-adjusted carry
4Note that the Sharpe ratio of the floating carry trade after transaction costs is much lower in the WWII
and Bretton Woods period than in any other period. This is because transaction costs were especially high
during the WWII and Bretton Woods period.
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returns do not increase once cross-rate volatility rises above 4%. Second, our results remain
unchanged when we adopt alternative methods of regime classification. Third, the inclusion
of 19 emerging market currencies from 1983 onwards in the investment universe does not
affect our findings. Last, we show in a panel regression setting that currency returns are
dependent on regime. All these robustness tests are described more fully in the Internet
Appendix.
V. Carry Trade Returns and Currency Peg
Collapses
So far, we have identified two strategies, fixed and floating carry, with markedly
different return properties. The positive risk-adjusted returns of the floating strategy
contrast with the zero returns of the fixed strategy. In this section, we focus on the
relationship between fixed and floating carry trade returns and exchange rate regime
switches.
The importance of currency regime switches for floating carry returns is illustrated
by the example on Jan. 15, 2015 of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) suddenly announcing
that it would no longer support the cap on the franc’s value against the euro. The impact
of this announcement was a surge in the value of the Swiss franc by 21% against the euro
over the following two days and a 5% loss of the floating carry trade over the following
month. Figure 5 portrays all the currencies floating against GBP in our sample at the
beginning of 2015. The Australian dollar and the New Zealand dollar, typically included in
the floating carry trade as investment currencies, depreciated dramatically relative to safe
haven currencies such as the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen which are typical funding
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currencies for the floating strategy. Interestingly, the U.S. dollar, another safe haven
currency, also experienced a large appreciation.
This Swiss example of a fixed-to-floating regime switch is suggestive of a global
flight-to-safety phenomenon. We next explore whether our data support the existence of
floating carry losses around regime changes and whether they can be explained by a
flight-to-safety phenomenon. Across the entire sample period of 1,175 months, there are a
total of 457 (463) months where regime shifts occur with non-missing floating (fixed) carry
returns: 208 (225) fixed-to-floating and 335 (324) floating-to-fixed. Accordingly, we analyze
the relationship between these regime shifts and spot returns by estimating the following
time series regression:
(11) −∆szt = α + β Dt,Fixed→Float + γ Dt,Float→Fixed + εt ,
where −∆szt is the realized spot return to regime z (z ∈ {Float, Fixed}) carry trade.
Dt,Fixed→Float is a dummy variable indicating that from time t− 1 to t one or more currency
pairs switch from the fixed regime to the floating regime. Similarly, Dt,Float→Fixed is a
dummy variable indicating that from time t− 1 to t one or more currency pairs switch
from the floating regime to the fixed regime.
Table 6, regression (1) shows that the switch of one or more currency pairs from a
fixed to a floating regime is associated with a monthly loss of 116bp to the floating carry
trade, sizable when compared with its monthly mean excess return of 59bp. The fixed carry
trade is directly impacted with a monthly loss of 48bp (regression (2)), given that the
regime shock is triggered by the collapse of one or more currency pairs in the fixed carry
trade portfolio. By contrast, a switch to the fixed regime from floating does not have a
significant effect on either floating or fixed carry trade returns.
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There are at least two interpretations of these results.5 One hypothesis is that there
are simply spillovers from collapses of fixed currency pairs that subsequently lead to
floating carry losses. An alternative hypothesis is that a flight-to-safety causes floating
carry trade losses when funding currencies appreciate and puts pressure on high interest
rate, pegged currencies, some of which subsequently devalue. Time series analysis does not
help discriminate between the two hypotheses. When we examine spot returns at a daily
frequency around fixed to floating regime changes, contemporaneous correlations between
fixed and floating carry returns are high but Granger causality test results are inconclusive
(and available from the authors).
In an attempt to further understand the dynamics underlying fixed and floating
carry returns, we decompose the contributions of the long and short legs to the returns to
each strategy in normal times and at the time of regime changes. The decomposition
results can depend upon the choice of reference currency. However, our findings in Table 6
using the GBP as the reference currency are unchanged for the U.S. dollar (see Internet
Appendix). The loss of 106bp on the floating carry trade at the time of peg collapses is
primarily driven by losses of 102bp from the short leg (regression (1)). Such losses are in
stark contrast to the significant gains from the short leg in periods with no regime change
(32bp). Irrespective of whether there are regime changes or not, the long leg of floating
carry contributes much smaller and statistically insignificant losses. Fixed carry trade
losses at times of peg collapse are more evenly balanced across long and short legs
(regression (2), 16bp and 32bp respectively), though only the contributions from the short
portfolio are statistically significant.
These findings are consistent with a global flight-to-safety interpretation and suggest
that the Swiss franc case discussed above can be generalized. In periods of fixed-to-floating
5We thank the referee for encouraging us to consider these results in more detail.
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regime change, the main driver of floating carry trade losses is the appreciation of safe, low
interest rate currencies rather than the collapse of risky, high interest rate currencies.
Secondary sources document a series of flight-to-safety episodes in the history of
international finance (Eichengreen (1996), Aldcroft and Oliver (1998), James (2012), and
Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)). How well do the largest floating carry loss events in our
sample correlate with such episodes? Out of the 25 largest monthly losses to the floating
carry trade associated with fixed-to-floating regime shifts, we find that 20 of these coincide
with key historical events. These include: the collapse of the gold exchange standard
system in the 1930s; the collapse of the managed floating regimes in Europe at the
outbreak of WWII; the European Monetary System crisis of 1992 to 1993; as well as the
climax of the European debt crisis in May 2010. Each of these episodes was associated with
high uncertainty on global foreign exchange markets and investor flight to safe haven
currencies (see Eichengreen). Hence, outsized carry returns can be viewed as compensation
for the risk to the floating carry strategy of fixed-to-floating regime shifts associated with
flight-to-safety in foreign exchange markets.
Our analysis has highlighted one type of bad times for floating carry investors that
feature unpleasant movements in the international financial system, namely collapses of
fixed exchange rate relationships. Since market volatility has been advanced as an
important explanation for carry returns, such regime shift episodes could simply be
proxying bad times as periods of high volatility. Hence, we test whether fixed-to-floating
regime changes remain negatively related to carry trade returns when we control for
exposure to volatility risks (Table 6). We model the volatility risk of the US equity market
(∆EQV) and of floating currency pairs in the foreign exchange market (∆FXV). The level
of volatility is measured as the exponentially weighted moving average of daily returns and
volatility risk is measured as the one-month first difference of volatility. The results show
that whilst the floating carry trade returns are negatively correlated with volatility risks
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(regressions (3) and (5)), the fixed carry trade returns are not (regressions (4) and (6)).
This evidence is consistent with our results in the previous section, the unprofitable fixed
carry trade is not exposed to volatility risks and therefore earns no risk premium. In
contrast, the profitable floating carry trade has negative exposure to volatility risks,
significant at the 10% level, earning a positive risk premium. More importantly, floating
carry returns remain negatively related to regime changes after controlling for volatility
risks (regressions (7) and (9)).6
Finally, we return to the discussion of our skewness results. In Section IV.C we
reported zero skewness of floating carry returns contrasting with negative skewness of fixed
carry returns. Whilst it might appear that this result is at odds with our finding that the
floating carry trade incurs considerable losses when there are fixed-to-floating regime shifts,
this is not the case. First, fixed-to-floating regime shifts are systematic in that all floating
currency pairs with positive interest rate differentials tend to incur substantial losses in this
regime-changing episode. In contrast, fixed-to-floating regime shifts contribute to fixed
carry trade returns only as an idiosyncratic shock. This is because by definition only those
fixed currency pairs (with positive interest rate differentials) shifting to the floating regime
incur losses, while other fixed currency pairs, with their pegs maintained, are not affected.
Second, in our long sample, the floating carry trade experiences large positive returns since
high interest rate currencies appreciate relative to low interest rate currencies before the
corresponding exchange rates are stabilized. For instance, from July to August of 1926, the
French franc and the Belgian franc appreciated by 19% and 9%, respectively, against the
U.S. dollar prior to their return to the interwar gold standard. Such appreciations
contribute to a positive excess return of 20% to the floating carry trade in that same
month. These positive returns add positive skewness to floating carry returns which offsets
6The Internet Appendix contains further tests that confirm the robustness of our findings regarding the
relationship between regime changes and floating carry returns.
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their negatively skewed systematic component. Hence, skewness is not an appropriate
statistic with which to characterize the risk of the floating and therefore the unconditional
carry trade.
VI. Conclusion
In this article, we document the long run performance of the carry trade using a new
foreign exchange dataset covering the history of established currency trading from 1919 to
the present. Using this database we first confirm that the carry trade generates robustly
significant long run performance. This evidence is invariant across different weighting
schemes for the carry trade strategy and after transaction costs are deducted.
Our key contribution to the literature is to examine how the risk and return of the
carry trade are related to currency regimes over this long run sample period. We report two
main findings.
First, we find that carry trade returns are related to both the time series and
cross-sectional variation of exchange rate regimes. Outsized carry trade returns can be
attributed exclusively to floating currency pairs. The average annualized excess return after
transaction costs is 7.11% per annum and the Sharpe ratio is 0.46. In contrast, the fixed
carry trade is not profitable. Perhaps surprisingly, the carry component of the fixed carry
trade, although considerably less than that of the floating carry trade, is nonetheless a
statistically significant 2%–3% per annum on average. However, this is fully offset by the
exchange rate depreciation arising from currency peg collapses. In other words, carry
strongly predicts future spot rate depreciation among fixed currency pairs. As a result of
the latter, fixed carry returns are negatively skewed. Importantly, the skewness of outsized
floating carry returns is insignificantly different from zero in our long sample. This result
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challenges the conclusion drawn from the analysis of the post Bretton Woods era that
outsized carry returns represent compensation to investors for bearing negative
skewness.
Second, exchange rate regime shifts offer a potential channel to explain the positive
mean return to the carry trade. While a floating to fixed regime change does not affect
carry returns, the breakdown of a currency peg is associated with floating carry trade
losses averaging 116bp per month. These losses are driven by the poor performance of the
short portfolio of safe funding currencies indicative of a flight-to-safety following such
breakdowns. Regime changes are sometimes clustered and we also conclude that the more
fixed exchange rates switch to floating, the worse the return to carry trading (even if the
investment universe comprises only ex ante floating rates). We find that a large proportion
of the largest monthly losses to the floating carry trade strategy at the time of peg
collapses coincide with historical events in the financial and currency markets which are
characterized by heightened uncertainty and are well documented in the secondary
literature.
Robustness tests show that our characterization of currency regime shifts is not
simply proxying exchange rate volatility. Consequently, we argue that the premium earned
by floating carry traders is in part compensation for withstanding substantial losses at the
time of peg collapses. Our explanation for the existence of a carry risk premium
complements existing explanations in the literature.
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Appendix A Equivalent Representations of Carry Trade
Returns
To help motivate our methodology of classifying exchange rate regimes and
conditioning the carry trade on currency regimes with regard to currency pairs, we start
with an alternative representation of the linear carry trade strategy, which is equivalent to
the linear strategy presented in Section III.
Formally, let the log excess return to the carry trade be
(A.1) rt+1 =
∑
i,j
wi,jt r
i,j
t+1 ,
where the weight on each individual currency pair is denoted as
wi,jt = At φ
i,j
t = At
(
φi,1t − φj,1t
)
and where At is an adjustment factor that alters the scale of
investment.
We first verify that this new policy rule is indeed equivalent to the linear policy rule
in terms of exchange rates against a given reference currency, indexed by “1”, without loss
of generality, as follows:
rt+1 =
∑
i,j
wi,jt r
i,1
t+1 −
∑
i,j
wi,jt r
j,1
t+1(A.2)
=
∑
i
(∑
j
wi,jt
)
ri,1t+1 +
∑
j
(∑
i
wj,it
)
rj,1t+1
=
∑
i
(
2
∑
j
wi,jt
)
ri,1t+1 .
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Substituting in the definition of the linear weights regarding currency pairs, we obtain
rt+1 =
∑
i
(∑
j
2At(φ
i,1
t − φj,1t )
)
ri,1t+1(A.3)
=
∑
i
2AtNt
(
φi,1t − φ1t
)
ri,1t+1
≡
∑
i
wi,1Linear,t r
i,1
t+1 ,
where Nt is the number of currencies available in the investment universe at time t. The
linear strategy in terms of currency pairs is equivalent to the linear strategy in terms of
currencies against a fixed reference currency as long as the scaling factors are defined as
At ≡ ALinear,t/(2Nt). Similarly, we show below that the regime-dependent carry trade
strategies can be implemented by an effective weighting scheme using only exchange rates
against GBP:
rzt+1 =
1
ωzt
∑
i
∑
j
wi,jt r
i,j
t+1 I
i,j
t (z)(A.4)
=
1
ωzt
∑
i
(∑
j
wi,jt I
i,j
t (z)
)
ri,1t+1 +
1
ωzt
∑
j
(∑
i
wj,it I
j,i
t (z)
)
rj,1t+1
=
2
ωzt
∑
i
(∑
j
wi,jt I
i,j
t (z)
)
ri,1t+1
≡
∑
i
wiEff,t(z) r
i,1
t+1 ,
where
(A.5) wiEff,t(z) =
2
ωzt
∑
j
wi,jt I
i,j
t (z) .
When estimating regime-dependent carry trade returns, we need to take into
account transaction costs. In Section III, we estimated the impact of transaction costs
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assuming linear strategy with a given reference currency. Of course, the equivalence of our
new representation of the carry trade based on all currency pairs to the linear strategy
representation with a given reference currency may not hold when transaction costs are
taken into account. This is because the choice of the reference currency matters for the
bid-ask spread and additionally because turnover rates will differ between these two
representations. However, bid-ask spreads are not needed and we can implement the
regime-dependent carry trade using exchange rates against GBP, recognizing equations
(A.4) and (A.5).
Since the carry trade strategy conditioned on all regime z currency pairs can be
implemented by the effective portfolio weights wiEff,t(z) using exchange rates against GBP,
transaction costs associated with this effective weighting scheme are measured as
(A.6) τspot,t(z) =
∑
i
∣∣wiEff,t(z)− wiEff,t−1(z)∣∣ BASi,1t ,
for the spot market and
(A.7) τfwd,t(z) =
∑
i
∣∣wiEff,t−1(z)∣∣ BAFi,1t−1 ,
for the forward market.
Finally, we can define the long and short legs of the regime-dependent carry trade
strategies using the GBP as the reference currency:
rzt+1 =
∑
i
wiEff,t(z) r
i,1
t+1(A.8)
=
∑
i
|wiEff,t(z)| IwiEff,t(z)≥0 r
i,1
t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Long Portfolio
−
∑
i
|wiEff,t(z)| IwiEff,t(z)<0 r
i,1
t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Short Portfolio
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FIGURE 1
Sample Coverage
Figure 1 graphs the number of currencies in the investment universe that are used to
construct the carry trade strategy over the period Dec. 1919 to Dec. 2017. Time is indexed
as of the portfolio formation date.
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FIGURE 2
Long-Run Carry Trade Returns
Figure 2 graphs the cumulative log excess return to the carry trade strategy from Dec.
1919 to Dec. 2017. The solid line indicates the return before transaction costs (T.C.) and
the dashed line indicates the return after transaction costs.
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FIGURE 3
Fraction of Currency Pairs in Each of the Fixed and Floating Regimes
Figure 3 describes the fraction of currency pairs in the investment universe that are
classified in each exchange rate regime based on a volatility threshold of 4% per annum
over the period Dec. 1919 to Dec. 2017.
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FIGURE 4
Cumulative Log Excess Returns for the Floating and Fixed Carry Strategies
Figure 4 plots the cumulative log excess returns before transaction costs (Graph A) and
after transaction costs (Graph B) for the floating carry strategy (solid line) and the fixed
carry strategy (dashed line) over the period Dec. 1919 to Dec. 2017.
Graph A. Before Transaction Costs
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Graph B. After Transaction Costs
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FIGURE 5
Case Study: Switzerland Abandons Euro Cap
Figure 5 is a scatter plot of the realized spot return against the forward discount of all
currencies (the Australian dollar (AUD), the Canadian dollar (CAD), the Swiss franc
(CHF), the euro (EUR), the Japanese yen (JPY), the Norwegian krone (NOK), the New
Zealand dollar (NZD), the Swedish krona (SEK), and the U.S. dollar (USD)) in our
investment universe floating against GBP in Jan. 2015. In that month, the Swiss National
Bank announced that it would no longer support the cap on the value of CHF against EUR.
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TABLE 1
Sample Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the number of monthly observations, the mean and standard deviation
(SD) of log excess returns (EXRET, % per annum), carry components (CARRY, % per
annum), exchange rate returns (SPOT, % per annum), spot bid-ask spreads (BAS, basis
points), and forward swap bid-ask spreads (BAF, basis points) for 18 exchange rates
against GBP over the period from Dec. 1919 to Dec. 2017. Panel A reports descriptive
statistics for the full sample period, Panel B for the interwar period (Dec. 1919 to July
1939), Panel C for the WWII and Bretton Woods era (Aug. 1939 to July 1971), and Panel
D for the post Bretton Woods era (Aug. 1971 to Dec. 2017).
EXRET CARRY SPOT BAS BAF
Country Obs. Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Panel A. Full Sample
Australia 396 0.66 12.74 1.30 0.66 -0.63 12.64 10 5 3 5
Austria 504 -0.05 8.02 -3.14 0.95 3.09 7.96 20 25 25 30
Belgium 877 -0.38 11.01 -0.88 1.22 0.50 10.95 13 13 11 11
Canada 1,055 0.35 8.69 -0.86 0.58 1.21 8.60 14 23 6 5
Denmark 818 0.96 7.47 -0.27 0.83 1.23 7.36 7 6 10 12
Euro 227 0.26 8.39 -1.06 0.25 1.32 8.38 6 2 1 1
France 879 -1.75 14.44 1.17 2.12 -2.92 14.66 9 8 10 10
Germany 652 -3.93 15.50 -3.15 1.04 -0.78 15.40 15 21 8 11
Italy 712 0.57 11.76 1.69 1.60 -1.12 11.52 10 12 14 17
Japan 537 -0.56 12.40 -3.83 1.46 3.27 12.34 22 18 4 4
Netherlands 866 0.34 7.52 -1.89 0.95 2.23 7.45 14 15 9 8
NewZealand 396 3.11 12.52 2.38 1.14 0.74 12.51 15 11 5 12
Norway 825 0.65 7.54 -0.20 0.86 0.85 7.47 9 9 9 11
Portugal 397 1.05 6.58 0.70 1.26 0.35 6.60 31 24 30 33
Spain 405 1.44 12.02 4.02 1.99 -2.58 11.98 16 12 20 23
Sweden 939 0.07 7.43 -0.46 0.86 0.54 7.40 14 16 9 10
Switzerland 1,152 0.16 9.55 -2.75 1.05 2.91 9.49 17 20 8 11
USA 1,176 -0.17 9.08 -1.21 0.68 1.04 9.04 7 7 5 6
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TABLE 1
Sample Descriptive Statistics (cont.)
EXRET CARRY SPOT BAS BAF
Country Obs. Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Panel B. Interwar Period (Dec. 1919 to July 1939)
Belgium 224 -3.19 17.50 1.06 1.74 -4.24 17.47 11 17 7 11
Canada 115 1.58 7.12 0.37 0.26 1.21 7.15 14 19 7 3
France 236 -3.33 20.37 4.04 3.39 -7.37 20.92 9 7 7 8
Germany 109 -20.39 33.37 -0.09 1.03 -20.30 32.98 19 38 7 7
Italy 191 0.95 18.86 2.12 2.11 -1.18 18.54 20 19 14 19
Netherlands 224 2.74 8.78 0.90 1.00 1.84 8.77 10 18 6 7
Spain 129 1.59 16.10 3.34 2.13 -1.75 15.85 19 17 21 22
Switzerland 212 1.26 11.21 0.49 1.08 0.77 11.21 11 20 6 10
USA 236 -0.3 9.49 0.37 0.47 -0.67 9.56 6 7 2 2
Panel C. WWII and Bretton Woods Era (Aug. 1939 to July 1971)
Austria 175 -0.17 3.87 -1.5 0.57 1.33 3.87 7 4 26 22
Belgium 324 0.35 5.43 -1.32 0.64 1.67 5.37 9 12 10 9
Canada 384 0.95 6.05 -0.82 0.44 1.77 6.00 24 33 9 5
Denmark 262 0.28 1.62 -0.02 0.48 0.30 1.56 4 6 15 14
France 314 -3.07 13.57 0.93 1.20 -3.99 13.65 7 8 14 12
Germany 214 -0.41 3.99 -2.31 0.80 1.90 3.99 3 4 5 3
Italy 192 -0.20 3.63 -1.09 0.75 0.89 3.53 3 1 11 13
Netherlands 313 -0.57 3.31 -1.69 0.56 1.12 3.27 9 14 9 7
Norway 269 0.15 3.05 -0.55 0.33 0.70 3.04 6 14 13 13
Portugal 209 1.18 4.32 -0.33 0.69 1.52 4.27 22 12 32 29
Sweden 383 0.14 3.76 -0.80 0.41 0.94 3.74 18 24 12 8
Switzerland 384 0.23 7.04 -1.82 0.57 2.05 7.01 17 23 10 7
USA 384 0.49 7.03 -1.26 0.41 1.74 7.00 11 9 10 7
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TABLE 1
Sample Descriptive Statistics (cont.)
EXRET CARRY SPOT BAS BAF
Country Obs. Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Panel D. Post Bretton Woods Era (Aug. 1971 to Dec. 2017)
Australia 396 0.66 12.74 1.30 0.66 -0.63 12.64 10 5 3 5
Austria 329 0.01 9.52 -4.02 1.01 4.02 9.44 27 29 24 34
Belgium 329 0.82 9.26 -1.77 1.12 2.59 9.09 17 7 14 11
Canada 556 -0.32 10.37 -1.14 0.68 0.82 10.25 7 5 3 5
Denmark 556 1.28 8.99 -0.38 0.95 1.66 8.86 8 5 8 9
Euro 227 0.26 8.39 -1.06 0.25 1.32 8.38 6 2 1 1
France 329 0.65 9.20 -0.65 1.27 1.30 9.01 11 7 9 10
Germany 329 -0.77 9.53 -4.71 0.93 3.94 9.45 21 16 11 14
Italy 329 0.81 9.27 3.07 1.45 -2.26 8.99 9 6 17 16
Japan 537 -0.56 12.40 -3.83 1.46 3.27 12.34 22 18 4 4
Netherlands 329 -0.42 9.27 -3.98 0.78 3.56 9.14 22 9 11 8
NewZealand 396 3.11 12.52 2.38 1.14 0.74 12.51 15 11 5 12
Norway 556 0.89 8.94 -0.03 1.02 0.92 8.86 11 5 7 9
Portugal 188 0.90 8.42 1.84 1.61 -0.94 8.47 40 30 27 36
Spain 276 1.37 9.57 4.35 1.91 -2.97 9.69 14 8 20 24
Sweden 556 0.03 9.14 -0.23 1.06 0.26 9.10 11 4 7 10
Switzerland 556 -0.31 10.35 -4.64 0.97 4.33 10.24 20 17 8 13
USA 556 -0.56 10.12 -1.84 0.79 1.29 10.01 5 5 2 2
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TABLE 2
Long-Run Performance of the Carry Trade Before and After Transaction Costs
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the annualized returns to the carry trade strategies
based on different weighting schemes including: (i) Linear weights a currency in proportion
to its forward discount relative to the cross-sectional average interest rate; (ii) H1 − L1
invests in the currency with the highest forward discount and shorts the currency with the
lowest forward discount; (iii) H25% − L25% takes a long position in currencies in the top
quartile ranked by the forward discount and a short position in those in the bottom
quartile; and (iv) Rank weights each currency in proportion to its rank in terms of its
forward discount relative to the cross-sectional median rank. For each policy rule, we report
the mean of log excess returns (EXRET, % per annum), carry components (CARRY, %
per annum), and exchange rate returns (SPOT, % per annum), standard deviation (SD, %
per annum) and skewness (SKEW) of log excess returns, and the Sharpe ratio (SR,
annualized), both before and after transaction costs, as well as correlation (CORR) with
returns to the linearly weighted strategy. Standard errors, obtained by bootstrapping under
the assumption of independent and identically distributed (IID) returns, are shown in
parentheses. The sample runs from Dec. 1919 to Dec. 2017.
EXRET CARRY SPOT SD SKEW SR CORR
Panel A. Before Transaction Costs
Linear 5.57 6.41 -0.84 10.72 1.54 0.52
(1.28) (0.34) (1.33) (0.97) (1.60) (0.10)
H1 − L1 7.63 8.76 -1.13 15.03 0.67 0.51
(1.72) (0.45) (1.76) (0.98) (0.89) (0.10)
H25% − L25% 5.02 5.48 -0.45 9.31 1.05 0.54
(1.06) (0.27) (1.08) (0.63) (0.83) (0.10)
Rank 4.76 5.16 -0.40 8.71 0.81 0.55
(1.03) (0.25) (1.05) (0.65) (1.08) (0.10)
Panel B. After Transaction Costs
Linear 3.91 5.26 -1.35 10.73 1.50 0.36
(1.28) (0.30) (1.33) (0.97) (1.59) (0.10)
H1 − L1 5.38 7.43 -2.06 15.05 0.64 0.36 0.89
(1.73) (0.40) (1.76) (0.98) (0.89) (0.10) (0.01)
H25% − L25% 3.54 4.42 -0.88 9.35 1.03 0.38 0.91
(1.07) (0.24) (1.09) (0.63) (0.83) (0.10) (0.01)
Rank 3.28 4.12 -0.84 8.74 0.79 0.38 0.94
(1.04) (0.22) (1.06) (0.65) (1.07) (0.10) (0.01)
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TABLE 3
Performance of the Fixed and Floating Carry Trades
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the annualized returns to the floating and fixed
carry trades. A currency pair is classified as in a fixed regime if its ex ante volatility is
below 4% per annum and in a floating regime otherwise. For each regime, we report the
mean of log excess returns (EXRET, % per annum), carry components (CARRY, % per
annum), and exchange rate returns (SPOT, % per annum), standard deviation (SD, % per
annum) and skewness (SKEW) of log excess returns, and the Sharpe ratio (SR,
annualized), both before and after transaction costs. Standard errors, obtained by
bootstrapping under the assumption of IID returns, are shown in parentheses. The sample
runs from Dec. 1919 to Dec. 2017.
Obs. EXRET CARRY SPOT SD SKEW SR
Panel A. Before Transaction Costs
Fixed 1,128 0.72 3.13 -2.41 6.64 -16.75 0.11
(0.69) (0.27) (0.89) (1.93) (4.70) (0.16)
Float 930 9.38 8.66 0.71 15.44 0.48 0.61
(1.76) (0.40) (1.30) (1.24) (1.12) (0.12)
Panel B. After Transaction Costs
Fixed 1,128 -0.55 2.34 -2.89 6.67 -16.7 -0.08
(0.69) (0.26) (0.90) (1.93) (4.53) (0.10)
Float 930 7.11 7.23 -0.12 15.42 0.30 0.46
(1.75) (0.35) (1.76) (1.27) (1.19) (0.12)
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TABLE 4
Indirect Effect of the Fixed Regime on Floating Carry Returns
Table 4 reports how the performance of the floating carry trade varies with the extent to
which either currency in each floating pair is fixed to some other currency. We categorize
floating currency pairs into three subgroups: (i) a Low Mix Floating pair indicates that
neither currency in the floating pair is fixed to any other currencies; (ii) a Medium Mix
Floating pair indicates that either currency in the floating pair is fixed to less than half of
the remaining currencies; and (iii) a High Mix Floating pair indicates that either currency
in the floating pair is fixed to more than half of the remaining currencies. For floating carry
strategy based on each group, we report the mean of log excess returns (EXRET, % per
annum), carry components (CARRY, % per annum), and exchange rate returns (SPOT, %
per annum), standard deviation (SD, % per annum) and skewness (SKEW) of log excess
returns, and the Sharpe ratio (SR, annualized), both before and after transaction costs.
Standard errors, obtained by bootstrapping under the assumption of IID returns, are
shown in parentheses. The sample runs from Dec. 1919 to Dec. 2017.
Obs. EXRET CARRY SPOT SD SKEW SR
Panel A. Before Transaction Costs
High Mix Floating 307 6.92 9.20 -2.28 17.57 -1.32 0.39
(3.53) (1.06) (3.46) (2.23) (1.32) (0.22)
Medium Mix Floating 626 7.12 7.13 -0.01 12.11 1.31 0.59
(1.68) (0.41) (1.19) (1.04) (0.94) (0.13)
Low Mix Floating 740 10.65 9.24 1.41 16.20 1.93 0.66
(2.06) (0.39) (1.38) (1.56) (1.24) (0.12)
Panel B. After Transaction Costs
High Mix Floating 307 3.52 7.21 -3.68 17.52 -1.69 0.20
(3.52) (0.95) (3.56) (2.34) (1.41) (0.21)
Medium Mix Floating 626 4.58 6.07 -1.49 12.22 1.11 0.37
(1.69) (0.38) (1.69) (1.04) (0.95) (0.14)
Low Mix Floating 740 8.15 7.84 0.31 16.13 1.91 0.51
(2.05) (0.33) (2.02) (1.56) (1.25) (0.12)
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TABLE 5
Fixed and Floating Carry Returns over Subperiods
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for the performance of the fixed and floating carry
trades for each of the three sub-periods, i.e., the interwar period (Panel A), WWII and the
Bretton Woods period (Panel B), and the post Bretton Woods period (Panel C). A
currency pair is classified as in the fixed regime if its ex ante volatility is below 4% per
annum and in the floating regime otherwise. For each regime, we report the mean of log
excess returns (EXRET, % per annum), carry components (CARRY, % per annum), and
exchange rate returns (SPOT, % per annum), standard deviation (SD, % per annum) and
skewness (SKEW) of log excess returns, and the Sharpe ratio (SR, annualized), both before
and after transaction costs (TC). Standard errors, obtained by bootstrapping under the
assumption of IID returns, are shown in parentheses. The sample runs from Dec. 1919 to
Dec. 2017.
Obs. EXRET CARRY SPOT SD SKEW SR
Panel A. Interwar Period (Dec. 1919 to July 1939)
Before TC
Fixed 214 -1.29 5.74 -7.03 13.41 -10.03 -0.10
(3.14) (1.27) (4.26) (5.13) (2.89) (0.32)
Float 223 19.79 10.55 9.24 27.52 0.07 0.72
(6.33) (0.97) (6.46) (2.73) (0.76) (0.24)
After TC
Fixed 214 -2.62 4.98 -7.60 13.44 -10.00 -0.20
(3.15) (1.25) (4.26) (5.12) (2.79) (0.25)
Float 223 17.10 9.03 8.07 27.56 -0.02 0.62
(6.34) (0.90) (6.45) (2.80) (0.80) (0.24)
Panel B. WWII and Bretton Woods Era (Aug. 1939 to July 1971)
Before TC
Fixed 384 1.27 2.70 -1.43 4.00 -10.79 0.32
(0.70) (0.17) (0.75) (1.25) (3.41) (0.46)
Float 151 5.54 7.42 -1.88 9.24 1.81 0.60
(2.60) (1.71) (1.79) (1.91) (2.23) (0.28)
After TC
Fixed 384 -0.19 1.55 -1.75 4.02 -11.08 -0.05
(0.70) (0.13) (0.75) (1.28) (3.34) (0.25)
Float 151 1.90 5.04 -3.14 8.88 0.82 0.21
(2.49) (1.49) (1.84) (1.82) (2.38) (0.28)
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TABLE 5
Fixed and Floating Carry Returns over Subperiods (cont.)
Obs. EXRET CARRY SPOT SD SKEW SR
Panel C. Post Bretton Woods Era (Aug. 1971 to Dec. 2017)
Before TC
Fixed 530 1.13 2.39 -1.26 3.13 -3.89 0.36
(0.47) (0.18) (0.53) (0.47) (1.82) (0.19)
Float 556 6.24 8.24 -2.00 8.25 -0.86 0.76
(1.20) (0.26) (1.25) (0.37) (0.20) (0.16)
After TC
Fixed 530 0.03 1.85 -1.82 3.19 -4.84 0.01
(0.48) (0.15) (0.50) (0.51) (1.79) (0.16)
Float 556 4.51 7.10 -2.58 8.28 -0.88 0.55
(1.21) (0.22) (1.22) (0.38) (0.22) (0.16)
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TABLE 6
Floating and Fixed Carry Returns and Exchange Rate Regime Shifts
Table 6 reports the relationship between exchange rate regime shifts and carry trade
returns. Using GBP as the reference currency, we regress the monthly spot returns (basis
points) for the floating and fixed carry trades on dummy variables indicating
fixed-to-floating (DFixed→Float) and floating-to-fixed (DFloat→Fixed) regime changes in the
investment universe, controlling for volatility risks of the U.S. equity market (∆EQV) and
of floating currency pairs in the foreign exchange market (∆FXV). We then repeat this
regression for monthly returns of each of the long (Long) and short (Short) legs of the
floating and fixed carry trades. Volatility is measured as the exponentially weighted moving
average of daily returns and volatility risk is measured as the one-month first difference of
volatility. ∗∗∗, ∗∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. The sample runs from Dec. 1919 to Dec. 2017.
CONSTANT DFixed→Float DFloat→Fixed ∆FXV ∆EQV
(1) Floating Carry 32∗∗∗ -116∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
Long 0∗∗∗ -15∗∗∗ -22∗∗∗
Short -32∗∗∗ 102∗∗∗ -23∗∗∗
(2) Fixed Carry -3∗∗∗ -48∗∗∗ -11∗∗∗
Long 10∗∗∗ -16∗∗∗ -31∗∗∗
Short 12∗∗∗ 32∗∗∗ -20∗∗∗
(3) Floating Carry 3∗∗∗ -9∗∗∗
Long -11∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
Short -14∗∗∗ 10∗∗∗
(4) Fixed Carry -19∗∗∗ -2∗∗∗
Long -6∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
Short -13∗∗∗ 2∗∗∗
(5) Floating Carry 6∗∗∗ -3∗∗∗
Long -11∗∗∗ -2∗∗∗
Short -17∗∗∗ 2∗∗∗
(6) Fixed Carry -18∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
Long -6∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗
Short 13∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
(7) Floating Carry 28∗∗∗ -112∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗ -8∗∗∗
Long 0∗∗∗ -15∗∗∗ -23∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗
Short -28∗∗∗ 97∗∗∗ -23∗∗∗ 9∗∗∗
(8) Fixed Carry -3∗∗∗ -48∗∗∗ -11∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
Long 10∗∗∗ -16∗∗∗ -31∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
Short 13∗∗∗ 32∗∗∗ -20∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗
(9) Floating Carry 33∗∗∗ -114∗∗∗ -3∗∗∗ -3∗∗∗
Long 0∗∗∗ -14∗∗∗ -24∗∗∗ -2∗∗∗
Short -32∗∗∗ 100∗∗∗ -21∗∗∗ 2∗∗∗
(10) Fixed Carry -3∗∗∗ -49∗∗∗ -11∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
Long 9∗∗∗ -17∗∗∗ -30∗∗∗ 1∗∗∗
Short 12∗∗∗ 32∗∗∗ -19∗∗∗ 0∗∗∗
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